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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Dewayne Banks appeals from the district court's order granting summary
dismissal dated January 26, 2010 (R., pp. 98-103), and the district court's order, filed
December 16, 2010; in which the district court dismissed his petition for post-conviction
relief (R., p. 325).

Mr. Banks asserts that the district court erred by summarily

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and by failing to alte,· or amend its
dismissal.
B. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings

On June 18, 2009, Mr. Banks filed a petition for post-conviction relief along with a
supporting Memorandum, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the
performance of both his trial level attorney (R., pp.3 and 4-22). due to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The State filed a motion for summary dismissal on December 4, 2009, alleging
that the application for post-conviction relief was not verified as required by rule, and
that it was untimely, pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902(1), and finally that the application was
an improper successive application pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. (R., pp. 96-97).
Mr. Banks, after not hearing from his appointed counsel on post-conviction, filed
a motion and affidavit for extension of time to amend his petition. (R., pp. 78-80). The
State objected. (R., pp. 84-85). The District Court issued an Order ruling the motion to
extend time and other procedural motions moot, and dismissing the application for postconviction relief as untimely under I.C. § 19-4902, and as an improper successive
petition under I.C. § 19-4908. (R., pp. 98-103).
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M.r. Banks filed a motion and an affidavit and memorandum in support thereof to
alter or amend judgment on post-conviction relief on the basis that disp:....tes of material
fact prevented summary disposition and that it was not a successive petition due to his
efforts on a federal writ of certiorari. (R., pp. 104-165).
Ultimately, the District Court denied the motion to alter or amend in its
memorandum decision. (R., pp. 304-324), and entered an order dismissing the petition

for post-conviction relief. {R., p. 325).
Mr. Banks timely filed his appeal. (R., pp. 327-330).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Bank's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a successive
petition, and/or failed to grant Mr. Bank's Motion to Alter fl~ Amend?

Ill. ARGUMENT

A.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Bank's Petition For PostConviction Relief As Untimely And As A Successive Petition And/Or Failed to Grant Mr.
Bank's Motion to Alter or Amend.

A petition for pastwconviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure
Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d
798, 802 (2007). Under Idaho Code§ 19-4903, the petitioner must prove tiv~ claims
upon which the petition is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Workman, 144

?

Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 .

A claim for post-conviction relief must be raised in an original application . 1.C. §
19-4908. That application must be filed within one year from the expiration of the time
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a
proceeding following an appeal , whichever proceeding is later. I.C . § 19-4902.
Successive petitions are impermissible "unless the court finds a ground for relief
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental, or amended application ." I.C. § 19-4908. Section 19-4908 sets
forth no fixed time within which successive petitions may be filed , however, the
"sufficient reason" language in the statute necessarily provides "a reasonable time
within which such claims [may be] asserted in a successive post-conviction petition,
once those claims are known." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870,
875 (2007). The determination of what is a reasonable time is considered by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. Id.

An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948,957 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, a petitioner asserting
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient reason" for
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a
two-level burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in

the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought. See Workm&a, 144 Idaho at
522, 164 P.3d at 802.
Summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when the applicant's
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the

applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual
issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho

517,518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d
241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163
(Ct. App. 1991).

On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an
evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleading, deposition, and admissions together with any affidavits on file.
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124

Idaho 894,896,865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).

1. Mr. Bank's June 18, 2009 application for post-conviction relief was timely filed.

It is Mr. Bank's position that his June 18, 2000 application for post-conviction relief
was timely filed in light of his federal habeus corpus case which he contends is a
proceeding following an appeal as contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(1), and that
therefore, the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition as untimely.

As the district court noted (R, p. 307), on August 22, 2002, Mr. Banks filed his

4

federal Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus, which was then stayed so Mr. Banks could
pursue his state remedies on direct appeal. Following dismissal of his appeal from his
earlier post-conviction action, Mr. Banks was permitted to re-open the federal case and
file an amended petition. (R., p. 307). Mr. Banks's claims were dismissed, and he
appealed. Ultimately, on April 20, 2009, The United States Supreme Court sent a letter
denying his final writ of certiorari. (R., p. 307).

Therefore, it is Mr. Banks's position that the habeas corpus proceedings that
ended on April 20, 2009 with the final denial of his writ for certiorari constituted a
proceeding following an appeal under I.C. § 19-4902, which would then make his June
18, 2009 application for post-conviction relief timely filed.

The district court in its memorandum opinion denying Mr. Banks's motion to alter
or amend reasoned that the line of cases beginning with Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho
627, 836 P.2d 1088 (Ct. App. 1992), determining what event marks the beginning of
the period of limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief, barred Mr.
Banks's argument that his federal habeas corpus proceedings constituted a "proceeding
following an appeal" . The district court distinguished the case of Atkinson v. State, 131
Idaho 222, 953 P.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1998), which held that a petition to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was filed after the denial of an appeal in the state
courts, and where that petition for writ was denied, the limitation period begins to run on
the date of that denial. Id. at 223. The district court reasoned that Mr. Banks's petiton
was not filed after direct appeal. (R., pp. 321-322).

It is Mr. Banks's contention that the district court erred in its ruling and by holding

that the Atkinson case did not apply. Mr. Banks argues that in fact, tbt denial of his
petition for writ of certiorari (habeas corpus) was in fact a "proceeding following an
appeal" in that it was filed on August 22, 2002, and was then stayed so Mr. Banks could
pursue his state remedies on appeal from the dismissal of his first post-conviction.
Following dismissal of his appeal from his earlier post-conviction action, Mr. Banks was
permitted to re~open the federal case and file an amended petition. (R., p. 307). Mr.
Banks's claims were dismissed, and he appealed. Ultimately, on April 20, 2009, the
United States Supreme Court sent a letter denying his final writ of certiorari. (R., p.
307). Therefore, Mr. Banks argues that his federal habeas corpus proceeding did
constitute a proceeding following appeal as it was part of a continuous stream of events
leading to the finality of his judgment of conviction, and pursued continuoi1sly regarding
error he felt occurred at all levels of his proceedings.

The Atkinson court reasoned that a petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court qualifies as a proceeding following an appeal, due to the power of the
United States Supreme Court to review state court decisions. Id. at 224. Mr. Banks
argues that he was pursuing diligently his claims of fundamental errors including
prosecutorial misconduct and a failure to instruct. It is Mr. Banks's position that until his
petition for writ was finally denied on April 30, 2009, the continuous stream of events
leading to the finality of his conviction had not run. In other words, he argues that his
habeas corpus proceeding constitutes a proceeding following appeal under Atkinson,
and I.C. § 19-4902.

2. Mr. Banks's Petition should have been allowed under I.C. 19-4901.
The district court stated that it was "unnecessary to engage in an analysis of why
this petition represents an improper successive petition." (R., 323). The district court
pparently concluded, though it did not specifically analyse that the petition was an
improper successive petition. Mr. Banks's contends that the district court erred by failing
to allow his petition under I.C.

§ 14-4901. Mr. Banks argues that he has made a

substantial factual showing that his claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been
raised earlier, allowing a successive petition under LC.§ 19-4901. He contends that the
ineffectiveness of his attorney at his first post-conviction prevented him from properly
presenting his arguments.
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411, 420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, a pem;c.,r~r asserting
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient reason" for
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a
two-level burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in
the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought See Workman, 144 Idaho at

522, 164 P.3d at 802.
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As stated above, summary dismissal of an application is permissible only when
the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved
in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Berg v. State, 131
Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738,739 (1998); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978
P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763,819 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Ct. App. 1991).

It bears repeating that on review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether a genuine
issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions together with
any affidavits on file. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d' 1066, 1069
(2009); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App. 1993).

Mr. Banks contends that he raised substantial facts in his pleadings (See R., pp.
3-22, 104-223) concerning the performance of his attorneys, that his underlying claims
were not adequately presented, and that the inadequate presentation of his claims was
due to the inadequate performance on his attorneys. IVlr. Banks contends that he raised
numerous facts presenting issues regarding ineffective performance by his attorney that
caused his underlying claim to be inadequately presented.

It is further Mr. Banks's contention that because he raised such claims, and
supported them with the facts in his pleadings which the district coJrl specifically
considered (R., p. 313), that summary dismissal, and the failure to amend or alter said
dismissal upon his motion, was error. The district court, on the other hand, determined

that it was "unnecessary to engage in an analysis of why this petition represents an
improper successive petition." (R., 323). As a result, the district court failed to properly
determine whether or not a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits on file as required by law.
Consequently, as the district court failed to properly analyse the factual questions raised
by Mr. Banks's pleadings and by the record, the court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition.
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, Mr. Banks respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this

_J_ day of December, 2011.
~PSON Conflict Appellate Public Defender
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